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THE ITEM VETO AND THE THREAT 




The item veto power forms an important check on the legislature in many 
states, including Alaska. The power allows the governor to veto individual 
items in an appropriations bill rather than vetoing or signing the bill as a 
whole. In 2011 the Alaska State Legislature contemplated challenging this 
crucial executive power. A proposed draft of the annual capital appropriations 
bill contained language that linked each energy appropriation to all the others, 
providing that if the governor struck one item then none of the items would 
go into effect. Further, the legislature inserted language providing that none 
of the proposed energy appropriations would go into effect if the section of the 
bill linking them together were successfully challenged in court. While 
neither provision was included in the final version of the bill signed into law, 
they prompted a controversy about whether such language would comport 
with the requirements of the state constitution. If they had been passed, the 
provisions would indeed have been unconstitutional and invalid, as they 
usurp the governor’s constitutional item veto power and violate the 
confinement clause’s requirement that the content of appropriations bills be 
limited to appropriations. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
At both the state and federal levels, the separation of powers 
comprises an essential part of the constitutional scheme. The dynamic 
tension caused by one branch of government limiting the others is 
designed to ensure that no one branch acquires too much power and 
engages in tyrannical governance. One of the ways the executive branch 
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checks the legislative is through the veto power.1 Many state governors 
enjoy a variation on the veto power, the item veto, through which the 
governor can strike individual items in an appropriations bill rather 
than veto or sign the entire bill as it is presented to him.2 The Alaska 
Constitution vests this power with the governor.3 Since the item veto is 
an effective check on the power of the legislature (and especially 
because this particular power limits legislators’ politically essential 
ability to bring state spending back to their home district), it should 
come as no surprise that the legislature occasionally chafes at the 
restrictions placed on them by this executive power.  
In the spring of 2011 the Alaska State Legislature contemplated 
mounting an attack on the governor’s item veto power. A preliminary 
version of that session’s capital appropriations bill, Senate Bill (“S.B.”) 
46, included language that would prevent the governor from striking 
individual energy appropriations and force him to accept or reject the 
entire package of energy spending as a whole.4 The governor’s office 
girded itself for battle, preparing arguments to challenge the language as 
unconstitutional.5 In the end, the litigation never came; the legislature 
removed the language from the version of the appropriations bill that it 
eventually passed.6 But the move to limit executive checks on the 
legislature’s lawmaking authority, tentative though it was, raises 
interesting issues about the interaction of the two branches in Alaska. 
The first part of this Note describes a constellation of constitutional 
provisions, both in Alaska and elsewhere, that pertain to the separation 
of powers doctrine. Section I discusses the item veto generally, including 
its theoretical justifications and where it appears. Section II describes the 
 
 1.  See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. II, § 15 (“The governor may veto bills passed 
by the legislature.”). 
 2.  See id. (“He may, by veto, strike or reduce items in appropriations 
bills.”). 
 3.  Id. 
 4.  S.B. 46, 27th Leg., 1st Spec. Sess. § 48 (Alaska 2011) (as reported by S. 
Fin. Comm., April 22, 2011) (“Each of the appropriations made in sec. 4 of this 
Act is contingent on passage by the Twenty-Seventh Alaska State Legislature 
and enactment into law of every appropriation, without reduction of any 
appropriation, made in sec. 4 of this Act.”). 
 5.  See generally Memorandum from the Attorney General to the Office of 
the Governor (Apr. 26, 2011), available at http://www.law.state.ak.us/pdf/ 
press/042611-memo.pdf [hereinafter AG Memo] (“This condition is 
unconstitutional and unenforceable because it deprives the Governor of his 
constitutional authority to review and reduce or strike individual appropriation 
items that do not serve the State’s best interests.”). 
 6.  See S.B. 46, 27th Leg., 1st Spec. Sess. (Alaska 2011) (as reported by H. Fin. 
Comm., May 13, 2011) (including no provision regarding contingencies based on 
reductions of appropriations). 
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item veto power as it is applied in Alaska. Section III addresses the 
Alaska Constitution’s confinement clause, a constitutional provision that 
augments the item veto power. The second part of this Note turns to the 
story of a recent controversy that implicates the constitutional powers 
and restrictions described in the first portion. Section IV outlines the 
legislative history and language of S.B. 46, the legislation provoking the 
issue. Section V endeavors to lay out and evaluate the arguments against 
the constitutionality of the proposed bill. Ultimately, this Note 
concludes that the language proposed in the bill would have violated 
the governor’s item veto power and the confinement clause. The issue is 
surely unsettled; the legislature removed the potentially offending 
language before passing the bill, and so the questions it raised were 
never brought before the courts for disposition. The lack of resolution 
means that nothing prevents the legislature, either in Alaska or in other 
states with similar constitutional provisions, from passing a future bill 
containing similar language. Thus this Note seeks first to provide an 
account of the events and attitudes in the spring of 2011 related to the 
legislature’s contemplated attempt to curb the executive’s item veto 
power, and second to take a position on the constitutionality of that 
attempt in an effort to contribute to the discourse should the issue arise 
in the future. Section I begins by setting out the constitutional backdrop 
against which it unfolded. 
I. THE ITEM VETO 
Most graduates of a high-school civics class will recall that the veto 
plays an important role in the checks and balances between the branches 
of government. For the sake of those who may have forgotten, veto 
(literally: “I forbid”) refers to “[a] power of one governmental branch to 
prohibit an action by another branch; esp[ecially], a chief executive’s 
refusal to sign into law a bill passed by the legislature.”7 The Federal 
Constitution and most state constitutions grant general veto power to 
the chief executive.8 This power allows the executive to reject a bill 
passed by the legislature in toto, preventing any part of the bill from 
 
 7.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1700 (9th ed. 2009). 
 8.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (“If he approve he shall sign it, but if not he 
shall return it, with his Objections to that House in which it shall have 
originated . . . .”); see, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. II, § 15 (“The governor may veto 
bills passed by the legislature. He may, by veto, strike or reduce items in 
appropriation bills.”); see also Alaska Legislative Council v. Knowles, 21 P.3d 
367, 371 (Alaska 2001) (holding that the Alaska Constitution “confers the general 
power to veto a bill”). 
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becoming law.9 However, the power of the executive is usually 
tempered by a process through which the legislature may override the 
veto and pass the bill into law despite the executive’s objections (often in 
the form of a super-majority vote).10 The drafters of the Federal 
Constitution saw the veto as “both theoretically and realistically 
necessary to preserve the separation of powers.”11 The general veto is a 
self-defensive, negative power used to block an act of the legislature, not 
a creative power wielded by the executive in crafting legislation.12 
Instead, the veto process serves the twin goals of allowing the chief 
executive an opportunity to consider bills passed by the legislature and 
allowing the legislature an opportunity to consider any of the 
executive’s objections and, in some cases, override his veto.13 This give-
and-take between the legislative and executive branches comprises an 
important part of the checks-and-balances system of the American 
constitutional tradition. 
The item veto (or line-item veto) comprises a separate and more 
rare variation of the veto power. In contrast to the general veto power, 
through which the executive may either sign or negate an entire piece of 
legislation, the item veto power allows the executive to “veto some 
provisions in a legislative bill without affecting other provisions.”14 
Unlike the general veto power, which can function only as a negative 
check on executive power, the item veto grants the governor a more 
involved role in formulation of the budget; it provides the chief 
executive with a “limited legislative function.”15 Whereas the general 
 
 9.  See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7 (making no mention of vetoing any bill 
only in part). 
 10.  See id. (“If after such Reconsideration two thirds of that House shall 
agree to pass the Bill, it shall be sent, together with the Objections, to the other 
House, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two thirds 
of that House, it shall become a Law.”); see also, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. II, § 16 
(stating that “vetoed bills become law by affirmative vote of two-thirds of the 
membership of the legislature”). 
 11.  Thirteenth Guam Legislature v. Bordallo, 430 F. Supp. 405, 409 (D. 
Guam 1977) (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 73 (Alexander Hamilton)). 
 12.  Id. (“Were it capable of creative as well as destructive use, there would 
be no question that the executive would be able to usurp the legislative function 
and irreparably undermine rather than preserve the integrity of the separation of 
powers.”). 
 13. See, e.g., Wright v. United States, 302 U.S. 583, 596 (1938) (“The 
constitutional provisions have two fundamental purposes; (1) [t]hat the 
President shall have suitable opportunity to consider the bills presented to him; 
and (2) that the Congress shall have suitable opportunity to consider his 
objections to bills and on such consideration to pass them over his veto provided 
there are the requisite votes.”). 
 14.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY  1700 (9th ed. 2009). 
 15.  Jeffrey A. Scudder, Note, After Rants v. Vilsack: An Update on Item-Veto 
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veto results in either enactment of the law as passed by the legislature or 
no law at all, the item veto opens the possibility of enactment of a 
budget different from the appropriations bill passed by the legislature. 
The chief executive is therefore participating in the process of making 
the law, an inherently quasi-legislative role. The authority to shape the 
contours of the law is not unchecked, however. Like the general veto 
power, the legislature can override the item veto, again usually in the 
form of a super-majority vote.16 Thus, the item veto allows the chief 
executive a greater role in the formulation of legislation, but still 
functions within the checks-and-balances system. 
The justification for the item veto power rests on a variety of policy 
goals. Professor Richard Briffault identifies three interrelated reasons: 
preventing log-rolling, imposing fiscal restrictions on the legislature, 
and fortifying the executive branch’s role in the budgetary process.17 
Log-rolling refers to the process in which several provisions supported 
by an individual legislator or minority of legislators are combined into a 
single piece of legislation supported by a majority of legislators on a 
quid pro quo basis: “no one provision may command majority support, 
but the total package will.”18 The practice is undesirable from both a 
theoretical and practical standpoint. It leads to government programs 
that are only supported by a minority of representatives, and it dilutes 
 
Law in Iowa and Elsewhere, 91 IOWA L. REV. 373, 376 (2005) (quoting Welden v. 
Ray, 229 N.W.2d 706, 709 (Iowa 1975) (Harris, J., dissenting)). But see Alaska 
Legislative Council v. Knowles, 21 P.3d 367, 372 (Alaska 2001) (“The council 
argues that the governor’s item veto power is negative. We agree. True, striking 
out language might be characterized as an act of positive creation . . . . But such 
characterizations are semantic.”). 
 16.  See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. II, § 16 (“Bills to raise revenue and 
appropriation bills or items, although vetoed, become law by affirmative vote of 
three-fourths of the membership of the legislature.”). See also NATIONAL 
CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, INSIDE THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS, tbl.98-6.22, 
available at http://www.ncsl.org/documents/legismgt/ILP/98Tab6Pt3.pdf (last 
visited Feb. 20, 2013) (providing a table listing the type of vote required to 
override a gubernatorial veto for different types of bills by state). 
 17.  Richard Briffault, The Item Veto in State Courts, 66 TEMP. L. REV. 1171, 
1177 (1993) (“The item veto represents the coming together of three widespread 
state constitutional policies: the rejection of legislative logrolling; the imposition 
of fiscal restrictions on the legislature; and the strengthening of the governor’s 
role in budgetary matters.”). Members of the Alaska Legislature and courts are 
aware not only of these three justifications but the specific article cited. See  
ALASKA H. JUD. COMM. MINUTES, 27th Leg. (May 11, 2011) (statement of John J. 
Burns, Attorney General at 8:09:33 AM); see also Knowles, 21 P.3d at 373 (“[The 
item veto] originated as a reform measure to prevent legislators from 
“logrolling” when they enact appropriation bills which necessarily address 
many subjects and need not be confined to a single subject, and to give 
governors some ability to limit state expenditures.”). 
 18.  Briffault, supra note 17, at 1177. 
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the executive’s general veto power by forcing her to choose to sign or 
veto the whole of a bill containing many heterogeneous components.19 
Many constitutions attempt to control log-rolling through single-subject 
or confinement rules (discussed in Section III infra) that restrict bills to a 
single subject, but alone these rules are ineffective because of difficulties 
in legally defining the scope of a “subject”.20 The item veto better 
controls log-rolling because it is vested in a political actor (rather than 
the courts) and narrowly targeted at the budget process (the legislative 
task most closely related to abusive pork barrel spending).21 
The other two justifications for the item veto pertain to its role in 
holding down state spending. The item veto allows governors to restrict 
legislative spending, making it easier to comply with the balanced-
budget rules common to many states.22 The actual success of the item 
veto towards this end is unclear as some scholarship suggests it is more 
likely to be deployed for partisan political reasons than in furtherance of 
a balanced budget, but nonetheless one hope behind bestowing the item 
veto power is that the governor will have an additional tool to reduce 
spending.23 Finally, the item veto, accompanied by the executive budget, 
should give the governor greater control over the budgetary process.24 
In most states, the governor drafts a preliminary budget that the 
legislature modifies and adopts to become the actual budget enacted 
into law.25 While the governorship is a statewide office and hence 
concerned about statewide fiscal goals, the legislature is composed of 
members with more narrow geographic constituencies. This results in a 
tension between the incentives acting on the governor and the 
legislature with respect to the budget; the governor seeks to control 
spending while the legislators pursue spending projects that benefit 
their individual districts.26 The executive budget should give the 
governor greater control over spending, and the item veto compliments 
that control by giving the governor the ability to cull spending tacked on 
to his proposed budget that does not support broader state fiscal goals.27 
Without the item veto, the governor would have no way to eliminate 
individual appropriations that mar an otherwise ideal state budget 
without rejecting the entire budget (most of which he suggested in the 
 
 19.  Id. at 1178. 
 20.  Id. at 1177. 
 21.  Id. at 1178–79. 
 22.  Id. at 1179. 
 23.  Id. at 1179–80. 
 24.  Id. at 1180. 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  Id. 
 27.  Id. at 1180–81. 
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first place). As some of the mechanisms that justify the item veto, 
especially balanced-budget requirements, are near universal at the state 
level but not present at the federal level, it comes as no surprise that the 
item veto is a common feature of state constitutions but not the Federal 
Constitution. 
The Constitution of the United States does not grant the President 
the item veto power.28 However, the President briefly enjoyed a limited 
form of the item veto power in the late 1990s. The Line Item Veto Act of 
1996 allowed the President to cancel various types of budget provisions 
already signed into law as long as he found doing so would reduce the 
budget deficit, not impair essential government functions, and not harm 
the national interest.29 The Supreme Court quickly struck down the act 
in Clinton v. City of New York as a violation of the U.S. Constitution’s 
presentment clause.30 The Constitution describes the process by which 
bills must be first presented to the President and then signed into law, 
and it contains no mention of the item veto.31 Only a constitutional 
amendment, not a statute, could alter the process.32 Since Clinton much 
ink has been spilled by legal scholars and political scientists over 
whether the item veto can or should be returned to the President, either 
by statute, court decision, or constitutional amendment, but currently 
the President remains without the item veto. 
In contrast to the President, most state governors do possess at least 
some form of item veto. Currently 44 state constitutions grant their 
governors the item veto power.33 With one exception, the item veto is 
 
 28.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7. 
 29.  Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 436 (2008). 
 30.  See id. at 448–49 (holding that the Line Item Veto Act violated art. I, § 7, 
cl. 2 of the Constitution). 
 31.  Id. at 439; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7. 
 32.  Clinton, 524 U.S. at 449. 
 33.  Item veto clauses can be found in the following state constitutions: ALA. 
CONST. art. V, § 126; ALASKA CONST. art. II, § 15; ARIZ. CONST. art. V, § 7; ARK. 
CONST. art. VI, § 17; CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 10(e); COLO. CONST. art. IV, § 12; CONN. 
CONST. art. IV, § 16; DEL. CONST. art. III, § 18; FLA. CONST. art. III, § 8(a); GA. 
CONST. art. V, § 2, ¶ 4; HAW. CONST. art. III, § 16; IDAHO CONST. art. IV, § 11 ; ILL. 
CONST. art. IV, § 9(d); IOWA CONST. art. II, § 16; KAN. CONST. art. 2, § 14(b); KY. 
CONST. § 88; LA. CONST. art. IV, § 5(g); MD. CONST. art. II, § 17; MASS. CONST. art. 
LXIII, § 5; MICH. CONST. art. V, § 19; MINN. CONST. art. IV, § 23; MISS. CONST. art. 
IV, § 73; MO. CONST. art. IV, § 26; MONT. CONST. art. VI, § 10(5); NEB. CONST. art. 
IV, § 15; N.J. CONST. art. V, § 1, ¶ 15; N.M. CONST. art. IV, § 22; N.Y. CONST. art. 
IV, § 7; N.D. CONST. art. V, § 9; OHIO CONST. art. II, § 16; OKLA. CONST. art. VI, § 
12; OR. CONST. art. V, § 15a; PA. CONST. art. IV, § 16; S.C. CONST. art. IV, § 21; S.D. 
CONST. art. IV, § 4; TENN. CONST. art. III, § 18; TEX. CONST. art. IV, § 14; UTAH 
CONST. art. VII, § 8; VA. CONST. art. V, § 6; WASH. CONST. art. III, § 12; W. VA. 
CONST. art. VI, § 51(11); WIS. CONST. art. V, § 10; WYO. CONST. art. IV, § 9. 
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limited to appropriations bills.34 The item veto began to appear in the 
late 19th Century as part of a series of new constitutional mechanisms, 
also including balanced budget amendments and single-subject rules, 
designed to reign in what was perceived as profligate state spending.35 
Georgia became the first state to adopt the item veto in 1861, while the 
most recent was Maine in 1995.36 Alaska did so while still a territory in 
1912.37 Unlike many older states, which have added item veto power 
through a constitutional amendment, Alaska’s constitution has always 
included the item veto.38 In addition to the power to strike individual 
appropriations items, a smaller number of states, including Alaska, 
allow the governor to reduce appropriations items.39 
The presence of the item veto may be common to most state 
constitutions, but the specific contours of the veto’s application vary 
from state to state. The dissimilarity arises either through different 
constitutional language or through variations in the interpretation of 
similar language by state courts. 
Given that the majority of state constitutions grant the item veto 
power, it comes as no surprise that it “has been a fertile source of state 
constitutional litigation.”40 Most implementations of the item veto share 
two features: the governor may veto individual items, and those items 
must be in an appropriations bill. Naturally, this creates two lines of 
frequent litigation over the subject: determining what constitutes an 
“item” and what constitutes an “appropriations bill.”41 Professor 
Briffault describes the first problem: 
[T]here is often no easy way to determine whether a particular 
provision of a bill is itself a freestanding item and not an 
inseparable part of a larger item. Moreover, legislation is not 
just a matter of cobbling together discrete provisions into a bill. 
 
 34.  Briffault, supra note 17, 1176–77. Washington state extends the 
governor’s partial veto power to all legislation, not just appropriations bills.  
WASH. CONST. art. III, § 12. 
 35.  Briffault, supra note 17, at 1176–81. 
 36.  See NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 16, tbl.98-
6.10 (showing the chronological order in which each state adopted the item 
veto). 
 37.  Id. The item veto was included in the governor’s powers by the Alaska 
Home Rule Act of 1912. The Alaska Constitution of 1956 retained the governor’s 
item veto. Id. 
 38.  Id. 
 39.  GORDON HARRISON, ALASKA’S CONSTITUTION: A CITIZEN’S GUIDE 66 
(Alaska Legislative Affairs Agency, 5th ed.), available at http:// 
w3.legis.state.ak.us/docs/pdf/citizens_guide.pdf (last visited Feb. 20, 2013). 
 40.  Briffault, supra  note 17, at 1172. 
 41.  Id. at 1174. 
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It is a process of negotiation and compromise in which the 
votes essential to the passage of a bill are attained by tying 
different elements together or by modifying minority proposals 
with new provisions, conditions, or restrictions until there is a 
majority ready to support the result.42 
Defining “appropriations bill” is no less problematic. States differ 
in how they categorize bills that combine spending provisions with 
general legislation and also in how to treat bills that affect spending 
without actually apportioning funds.43 As one of the states with a 
version of the item veto, Alaska has faced these same questions. 
II. THE ITEM VETO IN ALASKA 
Alaska embraces an especially strong form of the item veto, 
allowing the governor to wield great influence during the budgetary 
process. The governor’s veto power is described in the state constitution 
at article II, section 15, which provides “[t]he governor may veto bills 
passed by the legislature. He may, by veto, strike or reduce items in 
appropriations bills. He shall return any vetoed bill, with a statement of 
his objections, to the house of origin.”44 Both forms of veto powers 
discussed above stem from this section as it grants the governor both the 
general veto power and the line item veto power for appropriations 
bills. The section also grants the governor reduction power.45 
The Alaska Supreme Court has noted that the drafters of the state 
constitution intended to “create a strong executive branch with ‘a strong 
control on the purse strings’ of the state,” and a significant part of that 
control stems from a strong item veto power.46 The strong item veto 
power has allowed Alaska to control the rate of spending growth better 
than the Federal Government and states with weaker item-veto 
provisions.47 The inclusion of reduction power, the high number of votes 
required to override an item veto, and the restriction on the content of 
appropriations bills guaranteed by the confinement clause make 
 
 42.  Id. 
 43.  Id. at 1198. 
 44.  ALASKA CONST. art. II, § 15. 
 45.  Id. 
 46.  Thomas v. Rosen, 569 P.2d 793, 795 (Alaska 1977) (citation omitted). 
 47.  David Reaume, Line-item Veto a Powerful Deterrent, ANCHORAGE DAILY 
NEWS (Jan. 1, 2011), http://www.adn.com/2011/01/01/1627818/line-item-veto-
a-powerful-deterrent.html#storylink=misearch (“Most of the other 42 states with 
some sort of line-item veto have much weaker versions than does Alaska. That 
may partly account for why most states have not controlled spending as well as 
has Alaska.”). 
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Alaska’s veto power unique.  
Alaska is one of a small number of states that allows the governor 
to reduce the amount appropriated for a budget item.48 The reduction 
power is included in the National Municipal League’s Model State 
Constitution49 used in the drafting of Alaska’s state constitution.50 
However, the committee draft did not include the reduction power. It 
was added by an amendment from the floor of the convention.51 
Reduction power allows the governor to control state spending more 
precisely, as it resolves a situation in which meritorious appropriations 
items have been allocated an excessive amount of funds. In Alaska the 
governor can merely reduce the amount appropriated to these programs 
(and in so doing hold down state spending) while preserving the 
beneficial program itself as a consequence of the state constitution’s 
relatively rare grant of reduction power.  
Further, Alaska requires a uniquely high number of votes to 
override appropriations vetoes.52 While most states require a two-thirds 
majority to override, only Alaska requires a three-quarters majority.53 
The unusually large majority required makes override less likely and 
thereby increases the power the governor wields over the budgetary 
process.54  
Finally, the Alaska Constitution’s confinement clause (discussed at 
length in section III below) restricts the content of appropriations bills 
solely to appropriations.55 As a consequence of this clause, the only 
provisions that an appropriations bill, the only type of bill over which 
the governor wields item veto power, may include are of the type the 
governor can control via the item veto. 
While the power granted to the Alaska governor under the item 
veto is significant, even compared to other state governors in possession 
of the item veto power, it is not without limitations. In addition to 
legislative override, the Alaska Supreme Court case law interpreting 
item veto power curbs the governor’s power. In 2001, the court decided 
 
 48.  ALASKA CONST. art. II, § 15. See Briffault, supra note 17, at 1176 (“At least 
ten states allow governors to reduce as well as to disapprove items.”). 
 49.  MODEL STATE CONST. § 4.16(b) (Nat’l Mun. League 1968). 
 50.  HARRISON, supra note 39, at 5–6. 
 51.  Id. at 66. 
 52.  See ALASKA CONST. art. II, § 16 (requiring a three-fourths vote of the 
membership of the legislature to override an appropriations veto). 
 53. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 16, tbl.98-6.22. 
 54. During a Senate Judiciary Committee meeting, one of the senior 
members present said that he could only recall one gubernatorial veto being 
overridden. ALASKA H. JUD. COMM. MINUTES, 27th Leg. (May 11, 2011) (statement 
of Representative Carl Gatto, Committee Chair at 8:20:54 AM). 
 55.  ALASKA CONST. art. II, § 13. 
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Alaska Legislative Council v. Knowles.56 In Knowles, the Alaska Legislative 
Council sought a declaration from the court that the governor had 
exceeded his authority under the item veto clause.57 The governor had 
struck descriptive language from five appropriations items without 
eliminating the item entirely or altering the amount allocated.58 The 
eliminated language restricted the way the allocated money would be 
spent, in effect making the appropriation conditional on the fulfillment 
of requirements included in the provision by the legislature.59 The 
Alaska Legislative Council sued the governor, claiming the vetoes were 
invalid, and the governor counter-claimed that inclusion of the 
descriptive language violated the confinement clause.60 
With respect to the item veto power, the question in the case was 
whether or not the governor could strike descriptive language without 
affecting the rest of the appropriation. The state constitution clearly 
guarantees the power to “strike or reduce items in appropriations 
bills.”61 To determine what exactly it is that the governor may strike, the 
Alaska Supreme Court here addressed the meaning of “item” for the 
first time.62 The court concluded that “item” means “a sum of money 
dedicated to a particular purpose.”63 This holding rested on five lines of 
analysis, all of which indicate that the amount of an appropriation is the 
object affected by the item veto power. First, the court noted that the 
word “item” implies “a notion of unity between two essential elements 
of an appropriation: the amount and the purpose.”64 Altering the 
amount of an item is expressly allowed in the Constitution via the 
reduction power,65 but to alter the purpose would destroy that unity by 
fundamentally changing the item into something else not enacted by the 
legislature.66 Second, the use of the word “reduce” implies a quantitative 
effect, and the drafters likely intended the companion word “strike” to 
 
 56.  21 P.3d 367 (Alaska 2001). 
 57.  Id. at 369. 
 58.  Id. 
 59.  See, e.g., id. at 386 (discussing how the governor left the text 
appropriating $400,000 for construction of a new Department of Corrections 
therapeutic treatment community but struck out the end of the provision, which 
stated “where cost per inmate day (exclusive of treatment costs) will not exceed 
the state wide average cost per inmate day for correctional institutions.”). 
 60.  Id. at 369. 
 61.  ALASKA CONST. art. II, § 15. 
 62.  Knowles, 21 P.3d at 371 (“We have never addressed what ‘item’ means in 
context of the item veto power.”). 
 63.  Id. 
 64.  Id. at 372. 
 65.  ALASKA CONST. art. II, § 15. 
 66.  Knowles, 21 P.3d at 372. 
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have the same type of effect as well.67 Third, “reduce” and “strike” 
describe the same action applied to different extents: when an amount is 
“reduced” to the point where it is lessened to nothing, it is effectively 
“struck.”68 Thus, the object of the “strike” must be associated with an 
amount of money to the extent that it can be lessened.69 Fourth, the 
historical purpose of the item veto was to curtail the amount of state 
spending by mitigating the effects of log-rolling, a purpose most closely 
directed at the amount of the appropriation.70 Fifth, “public policy 
disfavors a reading of ‘item’ that would permit the executive branch to 
substantively alter the legislature’s appropriation bills, resulting in 
appropriations passed without the protection our constitution 
contemplates.”71 For these reasons, the court concluded that the power 
to “strike” only refers to completely diminishing the amount of an 
appropriations item, not the descriptive language accompanying it. 
The definition of “item” adopted by the court does not allow the 
governor to cross out descriptive language in appropriations bills as part 
of his item veto power. The five redactions in question affected only the 
way the “item” (i.e. the “sum”) was to be spent, not the “item” itself. 
The only components of an appropriations bill that can be item vetoed 
are items. Therefore the redactions were not strikes of an item, and were 
invalid. This holding would seem to severely limit the governor’s ability 
to control the budget, as it would allow the legislature to exert minute 
control over spending by including vast swaths of specific, non-item 
language determining how the money is to be spent. However the 
second half of Knowles, discussed in the next section, prevented this 
outcome by using Alaska’s confinement clause to severely limit the type 
of language that the legislature can include in appropriations bills. 
III. THE CONFINEMENT CLAUSE 
The discussion in Sections I and II of this Note indicates the 
importance of the item veto as a tool for the governor in exercising 
control over the appropriations process. The single subject rule and its 
close cousin the confinement rule are other constitutional mechanisms 
that complement the veto power and serve the same ends. The single 
subject rule, as the name suggests, requires that bills concern only one 
subject. The existence of the single subject rule can be traced back to the 
 
 67.  Id. 
 68.  Id. at 372–73. 
 69.  Id. at 373. 
 70.  Id. 
 71.  Id. 
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Roman Empire and was introduced to North America during the 
colonial period.72 The first state to amend the single subject rule into its 
constitution was New Jersey in 1844.73 Today single subject rules are 
present in the constitutions of the majority of states.74 The Nebraska 
Constitution demonstrates a typical manifestation of the rule: “No bill 
shall contain more than one subject, and the subject shall be clearly 
expressed in the title.”75 While the motivation for the rule is the same 
across states, the specific requirements of the rule vary greatly between 
states. Almost all states with a single subject rule include a “title 
provision” that requires the subject of the bill to be expressed in the 
title.76 Many states exempt appropriations bills from the single subject 
rule.77 Of those, a subset of states imposes a particular version of the 
single subject rule pertaining specifically to appropriations: a 
confinement rule. 
A confinement rule, which typically restricts the types of provisions 
that may be included in an appropriations bill solely to appropriations 
items, accompanies the single subject rule of some but not all state 
constitutions.78 In Alaska, the single subject rule and confinement rule 
 
 72.  Michael Gilbert, Single Subject Rules and the Legislative Process, 67 U. PITT. 
L. REV. 803, 811 (2006) (“The single subject rule can be traced to ancient 
Rome . . . . Similar legislative misbehavior plagued colonial America.”). 
 73.  Id. at 812. 
 74.  Nancy J. Townsend, Single Subject Restrictions as an Alternative to the Line-
Item Veto, 1 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 227, 248 (1984). See, e.g., ALA. 
CONST. art. IV, § 45; ALASKA CONST. art. II, § 13; ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. II, § 13; 
CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 9; COLO. CONST. art. V, § 21; DEL. CONST. art. II, § 16; FLA. 
CONST. art. III, § 6; GA. CONST. art. III, § 5, ¶ 3; HAW. CONST. art. III, § 14; IDAHO 
CONST. art. III, § 16; ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 8(d); IND. CONST. art. IV, § 19; IOWA 
CONST. art. III, § 29; KAN. CONST. art. II, § 16; KY. CONST. § 51; LA. CONST. art. III, 
§ 15; MD. CONST. art. III, § 29; MICH. CONST. art. IV, § 24; MINN. CONST. art. IV, § 
17; MISS. CONST. art. IV, § 69; MO. CONST. art. III, § 23; MONT. CONST. art. V, § 11; 
NEB. CONST. art. III, § 14; NEV. CONST. art. IV, § 17; N.J. CONST. art. IV, § VII, ¶ 4; 
N.M. CONST. art. IV, § 16; N.Y. CONST. art. VII, § 6; OHIO CONST. art. II, § 15(D); 
OKLA. CONST. art. V, § 57; OR. CONST. art. IV, § 20; PA. CONST. art. III, § 3; S.C. 
CONST. art. III, § 17; S.D. CONST. art. III, § 21; TENN. CONST. art. II, § 17; TEX. 
CONST. art. III, § 35(a); UTAH CONST. art. VI, § 22; VA. CONST. art. IV, § 12; WASH. 
CONST. art. II, § 19; W. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 30; WIS. CONST. art. IV, § 18; WYO. 
CONST. art. III, § 24. 
 75.  NEB. CONST. art. III, § 14. See Gilbert, supra note 72, at 812 (identifying 
Nebraska’s iteration of the single subject rule as typical). 
 76.  Gilbert, supra note 72, at 812. 
 77.  Townsend, supra note 74, at 248. 
 78.  Compare, e.g., ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 8(d) (“Bills, except bills for 
appropriations and for the codification, revision, or rearrangement of laws, shall 
be confined to one subject. Appropriation bills shall be limited to the subject of 
appropriations.”), with, e.g., GA. CONST. art. III, § 5, ¶ 3 (“No bill shall pass which 
refers to more than one subject matter or contains matter different from what is 
expressed in the title thereof.”). 
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are located in article II, section 13 referred to as the confinement clause: 
“Every bill shall be confined to one subject unless it is an appropriation 
bill or one codifying, revising, or rearranging existing laws. Bills for 
appropriations shall be confined to appropriations.”79 As described 
above, most state constitutions exclude appropriations bills from the 
requirements of the single subject rule (i.e. appropriations bills can 
contain appropriations on a variety of subjects). However, in those states 
with a confinement clause the only type of provisions allowed in an 
appropriations bill are appropriations items. The reasoning behind this 
runs parallel to the justifications for the item veto power. 
The confinement clause functions alongside the item veto to 
prevent legislative log-rolling. For bills enacting new substantive law, 
over which the governor has only general veto power, the single subject 
rule prevents tacking on unrelated, potentially unpopular provisions 
that would complicate the governor’s decision whether or not to veto 
the entire bill. For appropriations bills, over which the governor wields 
the item veto power, most iterations of the single subject rule allow for 
multi-subject bills.80 However, in states with a confinement clause, the 
only provisions allowed in appropriations bills are appropriations items, 
guaranteeing that the governor may veto any one provision of an 
appropriations bill. Logically, if provisions that were not “items,” 
“sum[s] of money dedicated to a particular purpose,”81 were allowed in 
appropriations bills, the governor would not be able to strike them via 
the item veto because that covers only “items in appropriations bills.”82 
This would force the governor into the position of either employing the 
general veto power, through which the entire appropriations bill would 
be vetoed, or signing the entire bill, including the potentially 
disagreeable non-item provisions, into law. The confinement clause 
ideally prevents this situation from transpiring. 
Like the item veto, the constitutional boundaries of the confinement 
clause are somewhat ambiguous, leaving the lower courts to flesh out 
the limitations. In Alaska, the prevailing test delineating the 
requirements of the confinement clause as they apply to appropriations 
was introduced by a superior court in Alaska State Legislature v. 
Hammond.83 The five-part test from Hammond was adopted on a “non-
exclusive basis” by the Alaska Supreme Court in Knowles.84 Under the 
 
 79.  ALASKA CONST. art. II, § 13. 
 80.  Townsend, supra note 74, at 248. 
 81.  Alaska Legislative Council v. Knowles, 21 P.3d 367, 371 (Alaska 2001). 
 82.  ALASKA CONST. art. II, § 15; see also, Knowles, 21 P.3d at 371–75 (holding 
that the item veto applies only to items). 
 83.  No. 1JU-80-1163 CI (Alaska Super., May 25, 1983). 
 84.  21 P.3d at 377. 
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Hammond test, to satisfy the confinement clause any qualifying language 
in an appropriations bill (1) must be the minimum necessary to clarify 
legislative intent on how the money is spent, (2) must not administer the 
program of expenditures, (3) must not enact law or amend existing law, 
(4) must not extend beyond the life of the appropriation, and (5) must be 
germane and appropriate to an appropriations bill.85 To pass 
constitutional muster, language need not necessarily satisfy all five 
factors; rather, the court will apply a balancing test.86 Courts apply the 
Hammond test under a presumption of constitutionality,87 and 
consequently expect that when several interpretations exist, the 
language in question will be read in favor of constitutionality.88 
Recall that the discussion in Knowles revolved around the presence 
of descriptive language within an appropriations item specifying how to 
spend the appropriated amount. The first portion of the opinion 
determined that gubernatorial striking of such language was not 
permitted under the item veto power, as the language did not meet the 
court’s adopted definition of an “item.”89 The later portion of the 
opinion deals with the governor’s counter-claim that the descriptive 
language was inappropriate for inclusion in an appropriations bill under 
the confinement clause, and should not have been present in the bill in 
the first place.90 Like the definition of “item,” the boundaries of the 
confinement clause requirement were addressed by the supreme court 
for the first time in this case.91 The court engaged in a fact intensive 
analysis of the five-factor Hammond test for each of the challenged 
items.92 With respect to the intent factor, language in an item that 
demonstrates intent about how other items will be spent does not satisfy 
the first prong of the Hammond test.93 Language that limited executive 
discretion in executing operations funded by other appropriations items 
amounted to administration of the program of expenditures, failing the 
second Hammond factor.94 To satisfy the third factor, germaneness, the 
language must have a direct rather than general relationship to the 
 
 85.  Id. (quoting Hammond, No. 1JU-80-1163 CI at 44–45). 
 86.  Id. at 382 (balancing the factors and weighing them against each other). 
 87.  Id. at 379. 
 88.  See id. at 382 (interpreting ambiguous language so as not to amend 
existing law or violate a Hammond factor). 
 89. Id. at 371. 
 90. Id. at 375–76. (outlining the governor’s objections under the confinement 
clause). 
 91.  Id. at 377 (“We have never delineated the boundaries of this 
requirement.”). 
 92.  Id. at 379–84. 
 93.  Id. at 379–80. 
 94.  Id. at 380. 
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program funded by the item.95 As for the fourth factor, language 
imposing conditions on other appropriations legislation impermissibly 
constitutes an enactment of substantive law.96 In this case, the failure to 
meet each of the first four Hammond factors was influenced by 
descriptive language in one appropriations item that interacted with an 
expenditure in another item. 
Ultimately the court came to the conclusion that some of the 
descriptive language in three of the five of the items in question violated 
the confinement clause.97 The court invalidated the descriptive language 
in these items despite finding that such language could not be struck by 
the governor via line item veto.98  After all, the absence of veto power 
over this type of language is ultimately irrelevant if the language cannot 
be included in legislation. While the item veto portion of Knowles limits 
executive power to some extent, the confinement clause prevents the 
legislature from exploiting that limitation. The boundaries imposed on 
both the executive and legislative branches in Knowles speak to whether 
or not the legislature can employ language that links multiple 
appropriations items together, a subject recently raised by the Alaska 
Legislature’s flirtation with such language while drafting the capital 
appropriations budget for the 2012 fiscal year.  
IV. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF S.B. 46 
Action by the Alaska Legislature in the spring of 2011 challenged 
the governor’s item veto power and the boundaries of the confinement 
clause. The senate version of the annual capital projects appropriations 
bill contained separate sections with language that attempted to bundle 
a large number of energy appropriations items together such that the 
governor’s striking of any one item would prevent all other items from 
going into effect. Before discussing the constitutionality of the language 
in the proposed legislation, establishing a timeline of changes to the bill 
will be helpful. In Alaska, the budgetary process proceeds as follows: (1) 
the governor prepares a proposed budget, which he then submits to the 
legislature; (2) the legislature considers the proposed budget, passes an 
appropriations bill that reflects their desired scheme of spending, and 
sends it to the governor; (3) the governor has the opportunity to exercise 
his item veto power by striking or reducing individual appropriations 
items; and (4) the legislature has the opportunity to override the veto or 
 
 95.  Id. 
 96.  Id. at 380–81. 
 97.  Id. at 384. 
 98.  Id. 
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reductions.99 
The story of Senate Bill (“S.B.”) 46 begins on January 19, 2011, with 
then-Governor Sean Parnell sending his proposed budget for fiscal year 
2012 to the legislature for its approval.100 The portion of the budget 
dealing with capital appropriations was designated S.B. 46 and referred 
to the Senate Finance Committee.101 The Committee had not completed 
work on the bill by the end of the session, so S.B. 46 was one of the bills 
listed for continued consideration when Parnell called the legislature 
back for a special session on April 17.102 On April 22, the Finance 
Committee adopted Work Draft 27-GS1740\T as the working text of the 
Committee Substitute (“C.S.”) version of the bill.103 At the committee 
meeting, a staffer discussing changes to the draft noted the addition of 
two new sections related to the section of the bill describing energy 
appropriations (section 4).104 The first added section provided that 
“[e]ach of the appropriations made in sec. 4 of this Act is contingent on 
passage . . . and enactment into law of every appropriation, without 
reduction of any appropriation, made in sec. 4 of this Act.”105 The second 
provided that if a court found the above invalid, then the referenced 
contingency is not severable from the section 4 appropriations.106 These 
two sections, referred to hereinafter as the contingency section and the 
non-severability section respectively, would be the subject of 
controversy in subsequent weeks. 
In reaction to the new language, Alaska’s Attorney General 
(“A.G.”) sent a memorandum to the governor’s office on April 26, 
advising (1) that the contingency section was unconstitutional and 
unenforceable, and (2) that the non-severability section was void and 
severable from the rest of the legislation.107 While the specific arguments 
of the memo are examined in more detail in Section V, it suffices to note 
that the memo concluded that the bundling language would violate both 
 
 99.  AG Memo, supra note 5, at 1. 
 100. ALASKA S. JOURNAL, 27th Leg., 1st Sess. 42–43 (Jan. 19, 2011). 
 101. ALASKA S. JOURNAL, 27th Leg., 1st Spec. Sess. 951, 957 (Apr. 18, 2011). 
 102.  Id. at 951. 
 103.  Senate Bill No. 46, ALASKA S. FIN. COMM. MINUTES, 27th Leg. (Apr. 22, 
2011) (statement of Senator Bert Stedman at 4:52:24 PM). 
 104.  Id. (statement of Miles Baker, Staff, Senator Bert Stedman at 4:49:17 PM). 
Note that in the committee minutes, Mr. Baker refers to the new sections as 
section 36 and section 37. However, in the final reported Committee Substitute 
version of Senate Bill 46, these sections ultimately become 48(a) and 49, 
respectively. 
 105.  S.B. 46, 27th Leg., 1st Spec. Sess. § 48(a) (Alaska 2011) (as reported by S. 
Fin. Comm., May 10, 2011). 
 106.  Id. at § 49. 
 107.  AG Memo, supra note 5, at 1–2. 
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the veto and confinement clauses of the Alaska Constitution. On April 
29, the House Finance Committee held a meeting to discuss the 
constitutionality of S.B. 46, and the A.G. reiterated the positions 
expressed in the April 26 memo: the contingency section of the bill was 
unconstitutional, and the risk of litigation over the issue jeopardized the 
funding of the fiscal year 2012 energy projects.108 
After continued revision of the S.B. 46 draft, on May 10th the Senate 
Finance Committee adopted a final version of the bill.109 The language of 
the contingency section remained unchanged, but was renumbered as 
section 48(a).110 The non-severability section was renumbered as section 
49 and its language was expanded: 
[I]n the event that a court of competent jurisdiction finds the 
contingency in sec. 48(a) of this Act is invalid, then the 
contingency in sec. 48(a) of this Act is not severable from the 
appropriations made in sec. 4 of this act if (1) the governor has 
vetoed, whether by striking or reducing, any appropriation in 
sec. 4 of this Act; and (2) the legislature, by action or inaction, 
has failed to override all vetoes of, including reductions to, 
appropriations made in sec. 4 of this Act . . . .111 
The Senate Finance Committee adopted the revised language and 
reported S.B. 46 out of committee with a unanimous “do pass” 
recommendation.112 The Senate passed S.B. 46 without amendment by a 
vote of 13 to 3 later that day and sent it to the House for consideration.113 
Despite the controversy over the contingency and non-severability 
sections of S.B. 46, the issue never came to a head because the language 
was removed in the version of the bill that actually passed into law. On 
May 13th the House Finance Committee adopted a revised version of the 
capital budget that had passed the Senate three days earlier and 
reported it out of committee for a floor vote.114 The new version 
 
 108. Senate Bill No. 46, ALASKA H. FIN. COMM. MINUTES, 27th Leg. (Apr. 29, 
2011) (statements of John J. Burns, Attorney General at 1:36:35 PM, 1:46:14 PM). 
 109.  Senate Bill No. 46, ALASKA S. FIN. COMM. MINUTES, 27th Leg. (May 10, 
2011) (statement of Senator Lyman Hoffman at 4:00:59 PM) (reporting bill out of 
committee with “do pass” recommendation). 
 110.  S.B. 46, 27th Leg., 1st Spec. Sess. § 48(a) (Alaska 2011) (as reported by S. 
Fin. Comm., May 10, 2011). 
 111.  Id. at § 49. 
 112.  Senate Bill No. 46, ALASKA S. FIN. COMM. MINUTES, 27th Leg. (May 10, 
2011) (statement of Senator Lyman Hoffman at 4:00:59 PM) (reporting out of 
committee with no objections); ALASKA S. JOURNAL, 27th Leg., 1st Spec. Sess. 1081 
(May 10, 2011) (listing committee members who signed with “do pass” 
recommendations). 
 113.  ALASKA S. JOURNAL, 27th Leg., 1st Spec. Sess. 1086 (May 10, 2011). 
 114.  ALASKA H. JOURNAL, 27th Leg., 1st Spec. Sess. 1239 (May 13, 2011). 
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completely eliminated the non-severability and contingency sections 
pertaining to energy appropriations.115 The same day the full House 
passed the new version without additional amendment by a vote of 30 
to 7 and sent it back to the Senate.116 The next day the Senate voted 18 to 
0 to concur with the revisions made by the House.117 The final bill was 
transferred to the governor the next month, and he signed it into law on 
June 29th.118 Notably, Governor Parnell exercised his veto power on 
several of the appropriations items in section 4, including the energy 
appropriations section that would have been covered by the original 
Senate version’s contingency and non-severability language, striking 
three items and reducing thirteen.119 
V. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF APPROPRIATIONS BUNDLING 
Had the legislature passed the version of the appropriations bill 
approved by the Senate Finance Committee, Governor Parnell was 
prepared to challenge its constitutionality. The crux of the argument 
against the bundling language is laid out in the A.G.’s April 26 memo to 
the Governor’s Office. The memo claims that the contingency and non-
severability would be unenforceable because they violate two separate 
constitutional provisions: the governor’s item veto power and the 
confinement clause.120 Had the issue been litigated, the Alaska Supreme 
Court would likely adopt the same conclusion based on relevant case 
law. The two prongs of the argument against S.B. 46 are laid out below. 
A.  Violation of the Item Veto Power 
The A.G. argues that the contingency language would negate 
Governor Parnell’s constitutional power to strike or reduce 
appropriations items.121 The memo notes that the contingency section 
links each of the energy appropriations to each other,122 meaning that 
 
 115.  S.B. 46, 27th Leg., 1st Spec. Sess. (Alaska 2011) (as reported by H. Fin. 
Comm., May 13, 2011). 
 116.  ALASKA H. JOURNAL, 27th Leg., 1st Spec. Sess. 1244–47, 1258 (May 13, 
2011). 
 117.  ALASKA S. JOURNAL, 27th Leg., 1st Spec. Sess. 1121 (May 14, 2011). 
 118.  ALASKA S. JOURNAL, 27th Leg., 2d Spec. Sess. 1172–73 (Aug. 24, 2011) 
(acknowledging signing bill with item vetoes). 
 119.  Line Item Vetoes and Reductions, S.B. 46, 27th Leg., 1st Spec. Sess. 
(Alaska 2011), available at http://www.legis.state.ak.us/PDF/27/Vetoes/ 
SB46.PDF. 
 120.  AG Memo, supra note 5, at 2. 
 121.  Id. 
 122.  Id. 
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Governor Parnell would be forced to choose between accepting every 
appropriation and vetoing them all.123 Citing a New Jersey case, Karcher 
v. Kean,124 the A.G. contends that contingency language would “too 
easily permit the legislature to circumvent the Governor’s constitutional 
veto authority” and should be deemed unenforceable.125 
Moreover, the non-severability language further weakens the 
Governor Parnell’s power. The A.G. observes that the non-severability 
language creates an “all or nothing” approach to appropriations.126 Even 
assuming the contingency section cannot survive a judicial challenge, 
“the legislature would still circumvent the Governor’s line item veto 
power if a court upholds” the non-severability section, because the non-
severability language would achieve the same effect of linking all energy 
appropriations together by different means.127 The A.G. argues the non-
severability language would grant an unconstitutional power to the 
legislature and is therefore itself unconstitutional, rendering it severable 
from the rest of the bill.128 It is unclear from the brief text of the memo 
how the non-severability language is itself an independent, 
unconstitutional usurpation of executive power. The A.G. elaborated on 
this point in testimony before the House Judiciary Committee, 
characterizing the non-severability clause as a “poison pill.”129 Even if 
the contingency section were ever successfully challenged, the non-
severability clause would negate the functional outcome by forcing 
courts to invalidate all of the energy appropriations.130 If it is an 
unconstitutional violation of a governor’s item veto power for the 
legislature to bundle all the energy appropriations together, it follows 
that it should also be impermissible for the legislature to oblige the 
courts to do it. The memo cites another out-of-state case, Legislative 
Research Comm’n v. Brown,131 to support the notion that it is not 
permissible to achieve an unconstitutional legislative objective through 
 
 123.  Id. at 3. 
 124.  479 A.2d 403 (N.J. 1984). 
 125.  AG Memo, supra note 5, at 3. 
 126.  Id. 
 127.  Id. 
 128.  Id. 
 129.  ALASKA H. JUD. COMM. MINUTES, 27th Leg. (May 11, 2011) (statement of 
John J. Burns, Attorney General at 8:39:49 AM). In finance,  “poison pill” refers 
to the use of “a tactic used by a company threatened with an unwelcome 
takeover bid to make itself unattractive to the bidder,” thus preventing the 
takeover. THE NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 1319 (Elizabeth J. Jewell & 
Frank Abate eds., 2001). 
 130.  ALASKA H. JUD. COMM. MINUTES, 27th Leg. (May 11, 2011). 
 131.  664 S.W.2d 907 (Ky. 1984). 
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judicial fiat.132 The A.G. claims that, under Alaska’s severability 
statute,133 the unconstitutional non-severability language is itself 
severable from the rest of the bill.”134 For these reasons, the memo 
concludes that both sections of the proposed S.B. 46 are unconstitutional 
The legislature disputes the persuasiveness of the cases cited in the 
A.G.’s opinion. In a memo written at the request of Hollis French (the 
“French memo”), the chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, the 
Division of Legal and Research Services suggests that neither Karcher 
nor Brown fully support the A.G.’s claims regarding the 
unconstitutionality of the contingency and non-severability language.135 
The issue in Karcher was whether or not the governor of New Jersey 
could veto individual budget items without changing the total 
appropriations amount.136 The New Jersey Supreme Court allowed the 
vetoes, as New Jersey’s version of the item veto power allows the 
governor to veto “in whole or in part any such item or items while 
approving other portions of the bill.”137 The French memo points out 
that New Jersey’s veto power is significantly different from Alaska’s, 
which would not have allowed the type of veto in Karcher because of the 
definition of “item” established in Knowles.138 Whereas New Jersey 
allows the governor to strike “any part” of an item, in Alaska only an 
entire item can be eliminated or reduced.139 Further, reducing the 
number of projects while not reducing the total funds allocated would 
have the effect of increasing the amount of money available to the 
 
 132.  AG Memo, supra note 5, at 3. 
 133.  ALASKA STAT. § 01.10.030 (2012). This statute provides that if a bill lacks a 
severability clause, it should be treated as if it contains a clause saying that if any 
provision of the bill is invalidated the remainder of the act is unaffected. Id. This 
statute has been interpreted as creating a presumption of severability, albeit a 
weak one. See Se. Alaska Conservation Council v. State, 202 P.3d 1162, 1172 
(Alaska 2009) (quoting Sonneman v. Hickel, 836 P.2d 936, 941 (Alaska 1992)) 
(holding that the statute inserts a “weak presumption of severability” into every 
bill passed by the legislature). 
 134.  AG Memo, supra note 5, at 3. 
 135.  Memorandum from Doug Gardner, & Pamela Finley, Div. of Legal and 
Research Servs., Legislative Affairs Agency, to Senator Hollis French, Chair of 
the Senate Judiciary Comm. (Apr. 28, 2011) (on file with author) [hereinafter 
French Memo]. 
 136.  479 A.2d 403, 411 (N.J. 1984). Specifically, the Governor eliminated 
several highway projects but did not remove the expenditures associated with 
those projects, meaning the dollar amount of the overall appropriation for road 
construction was unchanged even though it would be spent on fewer projects. 
Id. 
 137.  Id. at 406 (citing N.J. CONST. art. V, § 1, ¶ 15). 
 138.  French Memo, supra note 135, at 4 (citing Alaska Legislative Council v. 
Knowles, 21 P.3d 367, 374 (Alaska 2001)). 
 139.  Id. (citing N.J. CONST. art. V, § 1, ¶ 15). 
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remaining projects, an outcome at odds with the negative 
characterization of the item veto in Knowles, which emphasizes striking 
or reducing sums from a bill.140 The French memo concludes that, 
because each state confers a different version of the item veto power, 
Karcher does not support the A.G.’s contention that S.B. 46’s contingency 
language is unconstitutional.141 
While the French memo is likely correct that the facts in Karcher 
would result in a different outcome were they litigated in Alaska, that 
conclusion does not have a significant effect on the A.G.’s claim that the 
contingency language is unconstitutional. The A.G.’s memo was not 
attempting to analogize the specific facts or outcome in Karcher to the 
present situation. Instead, it cited Karcher as persuasive authority for the 
theoretical proposition that allowing individual appropriations projects 
to be linked “would too easily permit the legislature to circumvent the 
Governor’s constitutional veto authority.”142 The way in which projects 
are linked may be different. In Karcher the link was between the total 
appropriation for a category and a project within that category,143 while 
in the current matter the link is between projects within the energy 
appropriations category.144 However the point remains the same: 
preventing a governor from exercising his veto power over individual 
items in an appropriations bill by tying them to other items in the bill is 
an unconstitutional encroachment on executive power. The French 
memo’s distinction is irrelevant. 
The French memo also suggests that the other out-of-state case 
cited in the A.G.’s opinion, Legislative Research Commission v. Brown,145 
does not support the claim that the non-severability clause of S.B. 46 
constitutes a separate violation of executive powers.146 Again, the memo 
seeks to distinguish the facts of the case from the current situation. The 
decision in Brown affected two non-severability clauses.147 The first 
stated that if the portion of the bill that mandated all administrative 
regulations be approved by a subdivision of the legislative branch was 
invalidated, then the executive branch would be unable to issue new 
regulations while the legislature was not in session.148 The practical 
 
 140.  Knowles, 21 P.3d at 372; French Memo, supra note 135, at 4. 
 141.  French Memo, supra note 135, at 4. 
 142.  AG Memo, supra note 5, at 3 (citing Karcher, 479 A.2d at 412). 
 143.  See 479 A.2d at 412–13 (describing relationship between different 
appropriations vetoes). 
 144.  S.B. 46, 27th Leg., 1st Spec. Sess. § 48(a) (Alaska 2011) (as reported by S. 
Fin. Comm., May 10, 2011). 
 145.  664 S.W.2d 907 (Ky. 1984). 
 146.  French Memo, supra note 135, at 3. 
 147.  Id. at 4. 
 148.  Brown, 664 S.W.2d at 918–19. 
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effect of this non-severability clause was a legislative veto, which would 
be an unconstitutional violation of the separation of power. For this 
reason, the Kentucky Supreme Court invalidated the non-severability 
clause and severed it from the rest of the bill.149 The second non-
severability clause stated that if another part of the statute requiring 
approval of state applications for federal block grants by the same 
legislative subdivision were invalidated, then no federal block grant 
money would be spent.150 The Brown court allowed this clause to stand, 
reasoning that preparation of the budget (including block grant 
spending) is within the providence of the legislature under Kentucky 
law. Accordingly, the Kentucky Supreme Court held that this clause did 
not infringe on executive power.151 The French memo urges that Brown 
should therefore be viewed not as holding “all non-severability clauses 
are unenforceable” (as the memo characterizes the A.G.’s position), but 
rather that a “non-severability clause[,] in the context of appropriation, 
is enforceable.”152 
Again, the French memo seeks to draw a parallel where none 
exists. The second non-severability clause in Brown was upheld solely 
because it was not a separation of powers issue. It is the thrust of the 
A.G.’s position that the presence of the non-severability clause is itself a 
separation of powers issue.153 The inclusion of the non-severability 
clause in S.B. 46 creates a situation whereby if the governor attempts to 
assert his item veto power by challenging the contingency clause and is 
successful, he will in effect have negated all of the appropriations items 
in the bill, not just the ones he intended to veto. The process of 
exercising his power to strike individual items (by challenging the 
contingency language) would negate that power (by invalidating all of 
the items). This catch-22 makes the S.B. 46 language a separation of 
powers violation, just like the non-severability clause in Brown that was 
invalidated as a separation of powers violation. Despite the claim to the 
contrary, the A.G. is justified in citing Brown as supporting the assertion 
that a non-severability clause that usurps executive power is itself void 
and severable. 
B.  Violation of the Confinement Clause 
In addition to amounting to an unconstitutional usurpation of the 
 
 149.  Id. at 919. 
 150.  Id. at 928–29. 
 151.  Id. at 928–30. 
 152.  French Memo, supra note 135, at 5. 
 153.  AG Memo, supra note 5, at 3. 
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governor’s item veto power, there is reason to believe that the 
contingency and non-severability language in S.B. 46 violates the Alaska 
Constitution’s confinement clause. Knowles provides a five factor test, 
originally laid out in Hammond, for determining if the language of a 
proposed bill violates the clause.154 To stand, the language in question: 
(1) must be the minimum necessary to clarify legislative intent on how 
the money is spent, (2) must not administer the program of 
expenditures, (3) must not enact law or amend existing substantive law, 
(4) must not extend beyond the life of the appropriation, and (5) must be 
germane and appropriate to an appropriations bill.155 Had it been 
enacted, the contingency and non-severability language of S.B. 46 would 
likely fail the first, second, third, and fifth prongs of the Hammond test 
and, if challenged, be rendered unenforceable by the Alaska Supreme 
Court. 
First, the linkage language is more than the “minimum necessary” 
to establish the purpose for an appropriation. The effect of an 
appropriations item is to create a unity between purpose and amount.156 
The language describing what the legislature intends the sum to fund 
establishes the purpose the amount is allocated towards.157 The language 
in the contingency and non-severability clauses does not direct the 
manner in which funds are to be spent, as that type of purposive 
language is contained in the individual appropriations items in section 
4. Instead, the contingency and non-severability language controls 
whether or not the money can be spent at all. In drafting the bill, it 
appears the legislature attempted to show that all the appropriations 
must be enacted to have the desired effect. However, the presence or 
absence of the contingency language, or even the other energy 
appropriations, exerts no influence on the clarity of the description of 
what each item is to finance. For example, the $500,000 allocated to 
“Development & Export Authority – Coal to Liquids Certification 
Project” does not alter the apparent intent for the $10 million allocated 
for the Southeast Energy Fund, and the contingency language does not 
clarify intent with respect to either except to indicate that the legislature 
thinks both are worthy appropriations. The contingency and non-
severability language goes beyond the “minimum necessary” to 
determine how the legislature intended the funds to be spent. 
Consequently, it fails the first prong of the Hammond test. 
Second, the bundling of energy appropriations represents an 
 
 154.  Alaska Legislative Council v. Knowles, 21 P.3d 367, 377 (Alaska 2001). 
 155.  Id. 
 156.  Id. at 372. 
 157.  Id. 
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attempt to administer the spending program. Interconnected 
appropriations that combine to dictate the contours of spending policy 
are precisely the type of language that was disallowed in Knowles.158 
Here, the language connecting the items and constraining the 
executive’s discretion with regard to policy decisions is found in a 
separate section of the bill. The effect is the same as the intra-item 
language in Knowles.  
Similarly, the language has the effect of altering or adding to 
existing substantive law, in violation of the third Hammond factor.159 The 
language represents an attempt to alter state energy policy through an 
appropriations bill rather than a bill enacting new substantive law. The 
intent language of the bill references a state statute setting forth state 
energy policy. However, that statute makes no reference to bundling 
appropriations items. An all-or-nothing approach to energy 
appropriations must therefore be a new aspect of state energy policy, an 
outcome that Knowles determined to have no place in an appropriations 
bill. By attempting to alter policy and administer the program resulting 
from that new policy, the bundling language fails the second and third 
prongs of the Hammond test. 
Finally, the bundling language is insufficiently germane to the 
appropriations items it affects. Under Knowles, descriptive language 
must have a direct relationship to the manner in which money will be 
spent; a general relationship born of commonality of subject is 
insufficient.160 The bundling language has no relationship to the way any 
of the affected items will be spent other than the fact that all the affected 
items relate to energy appropriations. The contingency and non-
severability clauses do not prescribe the specific uses of the money 
appropriated for energy projects except to ensure that all the projects are 
enacted. But each item covered by the bundling language is a separate 
and distinct project, with all description of how that money is to be 
spent contained within the item itself. The bundling language is 
insufficiently related to the content of each appropriation to pass the 
germaneness requirement in Knowles. 
With at least four of the five components of the Hammond test 
weighing against the bundling language’s consistency with the 
 
 158.  Id. at 380 (“The vetoed language did not specify how these three 
appropriations were to be used, and instead addressed staffing funded under 
separate appropriations. This language effectively administered [the 
program] . . . because it limited the executive’s exercise of discretion in staffing 
and locating executive-branch offices whose operations were funded by separate 
appropriations.”). 
 159.  Id. at 380–81. 
 160.  Id. at 380. 
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confinement clause, the language would be invalidated if challenged in 
court. The end result is similar to the outcome in Knowles. While the 
governor lacks the ability to simply strike the contingency and non-
severability sections via the line item veto power (since they are not 
“items”), the legislature likewise lacks the authority to include the 
language in an appropriations bill. The failure to comport with 
confinement clause requirements is only compounded by the fact that 
the bundling language violates the separation of powers by attempting 
to usurp the governor’s item veto. Taken together, S.B. 46’s breach of the 
veto and confinement clauses make it unlikely that the bundling 
language would have survived if it had been enacted. 
CONCLUSION 
The saga of S.B. 46 ended not with a bang, but rather with a 
whimper. The contingency and non-severability sections never made it 
into the final bill, and the anticipated battle between the legislative and 
executive branches never occured. For an observer of Alaskan 
constitutional law, a court decision definitively settling the issue would 
have been more instructive (and certainly more interesting) than the 
détente that emerged. However, the same language might one day find 
its way into a future appropriations bill, either in Alaska or another state 
with similar constitutional provisions. If it does, the analysis above 
indicates that it should be struck down, both as a violation of the 
governor’s line item veto power and the confinement clause. Allowing 
the language to stand would mark a shift in the way power is 
distributed among the branches of the state government and would 
jeopardize the governor’s ability to check the legislature through his 
strong item veto power. If a clear system of separation of powers is an 
essential component of good governance, allowing the bundling 
language to stand would be a step in the wrong direction for Alaska. 
 
